


#### Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station



IMC 0350 Meeting

FENOC
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company



#### **Desired Outcomes**

- •Provide results of the Normal Operating Pressure (NOP) Test
  - People, Plant, and Processes
- •Demonstrate that we have identified and addressed plant material and people issues requiring attention for restart
- Communicate remaining actions for restart

## Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



### **Meeting Agenda**

•Outage Accomplishments	Lew Myers
•NOP Test Challenges	
–Equipment	Greg Dunn
-Operational	Mike Roder
•Assessment of Organizational Processes	Rick Dame
•Oversight Perspective	Steve Loehlein
•Results/Lessons-Learned from NOP Test	Mark Bezilla
•Remaining Actions for Restart	Mike Ross
•Overall Conclusions	Lew Myers

## Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC

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### **Personnel Changes**

- •Joe Hagan is the new FENOC Senior Vice-President overseeing Engineering and Support Services and reports to Gary Leidich, President and Chief Nuclear Officer FENOC
  - -Former senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations (Exelon Generation)
  - -Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering
  - -Master of Science Degree in Engineering Management
  - -Licensed BWR Senior Reactor Operator at Hope Creek
  - -Twenty-six years nuclear power experience

## Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



#### **Personnel Changes**

- •Barry Allen is the new Plant Manager for Davis-Besse and reports to Mark Bezilla, Vice-President
  - -Bachelor's degree in architecture structure
  - -Master's degree in Civil Engineering
  - -Senior Reactor Operator Certification at ANO-2
  - -Seventeen years nuclear power experience

## Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC

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Lew Myers
Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



#### **Desired Outcome**

•Reflect and status the NRC and public on our outage accomplishments to date



- •Restart Test Plan Objectives have been fully met
  - -Assured plant/personnel safety
  - -Conducted Post-Maintenance/Modification Testing successfully
  - -Results are being assessed



- •Demonstrated confidence in plant systems and equipment
  - -Completed Testing
    - -Integrated Leak Rate Test (April 9)
    - -50 psig Test (May 6)
    - -250 psig Test (May 25)
    - -Normal Operating Pressure Test (October 2)





**Plant Inspectors during NOP Test** 



**FENOC** 



- •Reactor Vessel and Reactor Coolant System
  - -Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Replacement \*
    - -Access Openings In The Reactor Vessel Head Stand
    - -Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Inspection/Repair
    - -Replace Reactor Vessel Head & Service Structure
    - -Reactor Vessel Head Transportation/Handling
    - -Service Structure Access Openings
    - -Original Reactor Head Nozzle Samples
    - -Original Reactor Head Shipped Offsite
  - -FLÜS Leak Monitoring System \*
    - -Installed FLÜS Leak Monitoring System
    - Incore Detector Tubes, to support repairs (pending NOP test results)



- •Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
  - -Replaced Pressurizer Code Safeties and PORV
  - -Reactor Cavity Seal Plate Modification
  - -Reactor Coolant System "Deep Drain" Valve Maintenance
  - -Replaced Thermal Sleeves for HPI Lines 2-1 and 2-2
  - -Fuel Integrity Verification
- •Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)
  - -Reactor Coolant Pump 1-1 and 1-2 Replacement
  - -RCP 1-1 Shaft Replacement
  - -Replaced N-9000 Seal Cartridges on all RCPs
- •RCS Thermowell Replacement
  - -Replace RCS Cold Leg Thermowells
  - -Replace RCS Hot Leg Thermowells



- Containment and Containment Systems
  - -Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Support
    - -Containment Structure Access Opening
    - -Restore Temp Access Openings
    - -Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
  - -Boric Acid Extent of Condition Inspections Completed
  - -Containment Emergency Sump Modification
  - -Removed Fibrous Insulation In Containment



- Containment and Containment Systems (continued)
  - -Containment Air Coolers (CAC)
    - Replaced Cooling Coils, Service Water Trees/Bellows, Drop Down Registers
    - -Replace CAC Fan Motors MC 2 & 3
  - -Annulus Work Activities
    - -Apply Water Tight Annulus Membrane
  - -Containment Vessel Dome Painting



- Containment and Containment Systems (continued)
  - -Containment Cranes / Bridges
    - -Polar Crane Refurbishment
    - -In-Mast Sipping Capability Mod
    - -Upgrade Of Fuel Handling Transfer System
    - -Upgrade Of The Main Fuel Handling Bridge
  - -Containment Moisture Seal Installation
    - -Containment Vessel Interface Seal



- Emergency Core Cooling System
  - -High Pressure Injection System
  - -Decay Heat System
  - -Post-LOCA Boric Acid Precipitation Control Modification
  - -Decay Heat Pump Cyclone Separators for Containment Debris Issue
  - -Decay Heat Valve Tank Modification





- •Electrical Systems
  - -Train 1 Station Battery Replacement
  - -Electrical Transient Analysis Program Modifications
  - -Thermal Overload Heater Modification on 28 Motor Control Center Components Overload



- •Emergency (& Station Blackout) Diesel Generators
  - -Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 Maintenance Outage (EDG 1 Scheduled Post NOP)
    - -EDG Motor Operated Potentiometer
    - -High Temp-EDG Rooms-Install Manifold Insulation
    - -EDG Room Temps-Install Ductwork
    - -Replace EDG Air Start Systems





- Instrument and Controls Systems
  - -Safety Features Actuation System
    - -Integrated SFAS Testing
    - -SFAS Relay Replacement / Restoration
  - -Radiation Monitor Upgrade Modifications
    - -Replace Control Room Radiation Monitor Recorders
    - -Replace Obsolete Victoreen Radiation Monitors





- Air Operated Valves
  - -Implemented program to improve response time
  - -Addressed 83 valves
  - -Established functional program





- •Plant Systems that will be removed from the a(1) Red Maintenance Rule status
  - -Auxiliary Feedwater System
  - -Instrument Isolation valves on RCS Reactor Protection System 2-Low Instrumentation
  - -Station and Instrument Air
  - -Containment Air Monitoring
  - -Emergency Diesel Generator
  - -Essential & Miscellaneous AC




#### **Management and Human Performance**

- •Root Cause training for employees
- Corrective Action Program Enhancements
- Problem Solving/Decision Making NOP
- •Standards and expectations training for employees
- Safety Culture Model and Assessment Process
- Operability Training for SROs and Engineers
- •New management team





#### DAVIS-BESSE SITE ORGANIZATION



#### **FirstEnergy**

#### **DAVIS-BESSE SITE ORGANIZATION**

DB Nuclear Restart Plant Support Services Engineering Manager Regulatory Affairs Manager Nuclear Training Manager Chemistry Manager Design Basis Engineering Patrick J. McCloskey John J. Grabnar MS - Nuclear Engineering BS - Civil Engineering SRO Certification - DBNPS SRO License (Beaver Valley) SRO - DBNPS Class III. State of Ohio. Operator SRO License - PNPP 23 years experience (FE) PE - States of Illinois and Ohio 24 years experience (17 years FE) 19 years experience (FE) Manager Radiation Protection Richard P. Farrell Manager Quality Services Manager Human Resources Manager Plant Engineering Linda M. Dohrmann Deanna L. Haskins Brian Boles 20 years experience BA - Human Resource Management/ BS - Mechanical Engineering SRO License - PNPP AA - Business Management 17 years experience (FE) 18 years experience (FE) Manager Plant Operations Manager Security Manager Project Management BS - Electrical Engineering SRO License - DBNPS SRO License - DBNPS BS - Mechanical Engineering 17 years experience (FE) SRO License - DBNPS 30 years experience (17 years FE) **Director Maintenance** Michael J. Stevens Experience: Return to Service Quad Cities SRO Certification 19 years experience (4 years FE) Manager Outage Management and Work Control Gregory A. Dunn

AS - Nuclear Technologist SRO License - PNPP

23 years experience (FE)





**Greg Dunn Manager - Outage Management and Work Control** 



#### **Containment Spray Pumps**

- Problem Statement
  - -Containment Spray Pumps failed to start on several occasions
  - -Initial Problem-Solving focused upon the over current trip
- Cause
  - -Probable cause was spurious trips from the Solid State Trip (SST) Ground Fault Trip Device
- Corrective Actions
  - -Pump #1 replacement breaker SST without ground fault trip
  - -Pump #2 replacement breaker refurbished SST
  - -Engineering Change under development for elimination of SST ground fault trips (extent of condition)



#### **Thermal Overload Relays**

#### Problem Statement

- -Thermal Overloads installed as a design change exhibited a trip
- -Some loads remained running following an overload trip

#### Causes

- -Sizing of the Thermal Overload relays
- -Relay Race Condition introduced

#### Corrective Actions

- -Overloads sized close to the normal operating current were replaced to increase margin
- -28 Circuits require overload settings increased and 15 circuits require wiring changes (extent of condition)



## **Equipment Challenges Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Testing**

#### Problem Statement

-Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 response time exceeded Acceptance Criteria

#### •Cause

-Misalignment of governor valve linkage coupled with installation of a new valve

#### Corrective Actions

- -Governor linkage was disconnected and adjusted/reconnected in accordance with plant maintenance procedures
- -Response time repeatability demonstrated with confidence tests



#### Mode 3 Walkdown Summary

Category	<u>Description</u>	Total Items
No Action Required	Findings that are documented but no actions are required (Monitor per Boric Acid Corrosion Program)	31
Ready for reinspection	Components that were adjusted and cleaned and are ready for reinspect	24 ction
Reinspection Satisfactory	Components that were adjusted, cleaned and reinspected satisfactorily	47
Action Required	Components that require repair adjustment, cleaning, etc., that was ur to be preformed during Mode 3	61 nable
Total Total Walkdown/Inspection	on population (approximately)	163 1342

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FENOC



#### NOP Test Challenges Operations



## **Mike Roder Manager - Plant Operations**



#### **Desired Outcome**

•Demonstrate confidence in addressing NOP Test Operational Issues



### **NOP Test Challenges**

#### **Core Flood Tank Valve**

- Problem Statement
  - -Inadvertent opening of Core Flood Tank Valve (CF1B)
- Causes
  - -Procedure guidance
  - -Operator performance
  - -Training
- Corrective Actions
  - -Relieved crew
  - -Corrected procedure
  - -Conducted just-in-time training
  - -Improved standards for pre-job briefs



### **NOP Test Challenges**

#### **Reactor Protection System Trip**

- Problem Statement
  - -RPS tripped
- Causes
  - -Procedure guidance
  - Operator performance
  - -Training
- Corrective Actions
  - -Relieved crew
  - -Created management guidance for cooldown activities
  - -Revised procedure
  - -Created reverse pre-job brief document
  - -Conducted training for each evolution
  - -Added FENOC oversight in Control Room



## NOP Test Challenges Operations

#### Operations Action Plan

- -Root Cause and Collective Significance Teams formed
- -Interviewed each Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator
- -Optimize Operating Crews
- -Strengthen integrated Operating procedures
- -Improve Operator Training
- -Assess enhanced crew oversight



## NOP Test Challenges Conclusion

- Conclusions
  - -NOP Test was successful
  - -Operation performance issues identified
  - -Operations Action Plan will address corrections





# **Operational Readiness Assessment Results**




**Rick Dame Reliability Unit - Supervisor** 



- Desired Outcome
  - Share observations and conclusions from "Operational Readiness Assessment"
- Assessment methodology
  - Integrated Assessment Team
  - Applied industry recognized standards of excellence.
  - Conducted per Integrated Restart Test Plan



## INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT DURING NOP TEST





- Observation Summary
  - In general, observations from peers outside of the Davis-Besse organization tended to be more critical of performance
  - Shift management oversight of operational activities can be improved



- Observation Summary
  - Some performance shortfalls were identified in the monitoring of plant parameters and trends, and in turn, anticipating the operational impact of these trends
  - Differences exist in operational pre-job briefs
     standards between Davis-Besse and industry leaders



- Observation Summary
  - The quality of some operational procedures is below that observed at industry leading performers
  - Some weaknesses were observed in the area of procedural compliance



- Observation Summary
  - Problem Solving and Decision Making Process was used by station personnel to resolve complex issues
  - Improvements can be made in the implementation of the Problem Solving and Decision Making Process



- Observation Summary
  - Benchstrength in certain technical disciplines must be replenished to support sustained organizational performance improvement
  - System Engineering/Operations interface is not as strong as that observed at industry leaders
  - Improvement opportunities exist in the performance of Management observations and coaching



#### Conclusions

- Processes and programs support safe and
   reliable operation when properly implemented
- Station Management demonstrated effective operational decision making principles when collectively engaged
- Improvements must be implemented to address Operations performance



### **Oversight Perspective**



Steve Loehlein

Manager – Nuclear Quality Assessment



### **Assessment Objectives**

- •Health of Plant Systems and Equipment
- Organizational effectiveness
- •Effectiveness of Restart Test Plan



#### **Assessment Results**

- •Health of Plant Systems and Equipment
  - -Equipment performance
  - -Plant Walkdown results



#### **Assessment Results**

- Organizational Effectiveness
  - -Operations Leadership
  - Safety Culture
  - Configuration Control
  - Procedure Compliance





#### **Assessment Results**

#### •Restart Test Plan

- -Provided valuable insights for Management
- -Emphasis on Control Room Activities and organizational response to emergent issues
- -Observations and conclusions similar to those of Quality Oversight



### **Key Lessons Learned**

- •Organizational weaknesses appear to have been factors in performance shortfalls
- •Prevention of unintended plant responses requires effective barriers prior to Operations' performance of evolutions



#### Recommendations

#### Organizational

- Complete Collective Significance review of causes of performance shortfalls
  - -Identify causes (barriers) that need attention
  - -Utilize external assistance to ensure completeness of corrective actions
  - -Ensure procedures, training, and performance standards are adequate for future plant evolutions
  - -Implement appropriate corrective actions



#### Recommendations

- Organizational (continued)
  - -Train on Configuration Management process
  - -Implement effective trend review process
  - Ensure quality and execution of key Operations procedures
  - -Improve coordination of Problem-Solving process with Corrective Action Program
  - -Emphasize need for inter-department management challenges



#### Recommendations

#### Oversight

- -Supplement Management and Quality Oversight with off-site assistance to improve objectivity and ensure assessments are sufficiently critical
- -Focus Quality Oversight on cross-functional activities and interfaces



#### Normal Operating Pressure Test Results/Lessons-Learned



Mark Bezilla
Vice President/Plant Manager



#### **Desired Outcome**

•Provide an overview of what we learned from the Normal Operating Pressure Test



### Restart Test Program

- •Integrated Leak Rate Test Completed (April 9)
- •50 psig Test Completed (May 6)
- •250 psig Test Complete (May 25)
- •Normal Operation Pressure Test Completed (October 2)



### Normal Operating Pressure Test Heat Up

- •Started heat up September 13
- •NOP Test was an opportunity to assess our people, plant, and processes
- •Challenges during test were handled in a safe manner and posed a minimal safety risk
  - -Steam Line Noise September 13
  - -Core Flood Tank Valve Opening September 15
  - -Containment Spray September 17
- Conclusion
  - -Plant issues were investigated and managed



## **Normal Operating Pressure Test**

- Total time of test
  - − > 8 days at Normal Operating Pressure
- Inspected 1300 components
- Overall Leak Rate
  - –Best in history of plant ~ .006 gpm
- First-ever successful test of FLÜS Leak Monitoring System in the United States
- Proved that our new Reactor Coolant System leak rate program works



## **Normal Operating Pressure Test**

- Completed ~ 700 Post Maintenance/Modification Tests
- Tested most primary/secondary equipment
  - -Reactor Coolant Pumps
  - -Condensate Pumps
  - -Feedwater
  - -Makeup
  - -Circulating Water
  - -Condenser activities
- Demonstrated positive Safety Culture and teamwork
  - -Focused on Industrial Safety, Nuclear, and Radiological Safety
  - -Organization Effectiveness to resolve issues
  - -Problem Solving / Decision Making exercised



#### Normal Operating Pressure Test Cooldown

- Reactor Trip
  - -One bank of control rods were pulled as conservative action
- Problem Solving / Decision Making Team initiated
- Remainder of cooldown to Mode 5 not only event-less but error free



#### Normal Operating Pressure Test Restart Test Plan

#### Conclusions

- -Focused on safety
- -Demonstrated Reactor Coolant System integrity
- -Significant Program Improvements
- -Demonstrated state-of-the-art technology (FLÜS Leak Monitoring System)
- -Containment and overall System Health is very good





Mike Ross
Restart Director



- •Restart Actions include
  - -Completion of 10CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and Accuracy of Information' training
  - -Alignment / teamwork sessions
    - One day-long site alignment / teambuilding sessions with employees
    - Learning Map rollout
    - Operational focus
  - -Strengthen our Calculation Program



- •Restart Actions include
  - -Strengthen our Condition Report Process
    - Condition Report Evaluators will receive Apparent Cause training
    - Establish an Apparent Cause Review Group consisting of Condition Report Analysts
  - -Corrective Action Trending
  - -Plant activities
    - Electrical Transient Analysis Program (ETAP) modifications
    - High Pressure Injection Pumps modification
    - Repair Containment Air Coolers
    - Electrical breaker co-ordination modification
    - Finish AOV Modification work



- •Restart Actions include
  - -Address Lessons-Learned and actions resulting from NOP Test
  - -Restart Readiness Reviews





#### **Overall Conclusions**



## Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC



#### **Overall NOP Test Conclusions**

- •Many technical plant changes that improve overall plant safety
- NOP Test demonstrated
  - -Areas of improvement for people to safely operate the plant
  - -Response to emergent issues
  - -Condition of plant equipment
    - -Identified secondary leaks
  - -Integrity of reactor coolant system
    - -Replacement Reactor Vessel Head
    - -Incore monitoring instrument nozzles



#### **Overall NOP Test Conclusions**

- •Davis-Besse personnel are demonstrating a positive Safety Culture
- •Davis-Besse is completing actions necessary to resume safe plant operation